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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AQUA MASSAGE, L.L.C. and/or : 
HARTFORD/TWIN CITY FIRE 
INSURANCE, : 
Respondents/Appellants, 
vs. : Case No. 20030965-CA 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and : Labor Commission No. 2000807 
ROBERT B. HIGGINS, 
: Priority 7 
Petitioners/Appellees. 
JURISDICTION 
The Petition for Review by Appellants (hereinafter j ointly referred to as "Employers") 
is from an Order Denying Motion for Review, issued by the Labor Commission of Utah, 
dated November 6, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from workers' 
compensation decisions of the Labor Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § §34A-2-801 
(8), §§63-46b-13 through 16, and §78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the Labor Commission abused their 
discretion by determining that the automobile accident on August 1, 2000, in which Mr. 
Higgins' suffered his injuries, "arose out of and in the course of his employment, where the 
accident occurred while he was on his way in his vehicle from the "home office" at which 
he regularly worked for the Employer, to a kiosk owned and operated by his Employer at 
Fashion Place Mall, where he had performed some work that morning and was carrying 
work-related items for delivery to the kiosk, and where he was going to operate that kiosk 
that particular day. The facts further reflected that his duties included transporting 
merchandise from his home to Aqua's sales locations (including that kiosk), travel between 
the sales locations (including that kiosk), and travel for other business purposes such as 
depositing sales receipts. 
The basic standard of review for that issue is established by statute: "The commission 
has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction and authority to determine the facts and apply 
the law in this chapter or any other title it administers."1 The standard has been summarized 
as follows: 
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before 
it. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). As such, we must uphold the 
Commission's determination (injured in course of employment) unless the 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA. 
Moreover, we resolve, "'[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in 
favor of the injured employee.'" Drake v. Industrial Comm % 939 P. 2d 177, 
182 (Utah, 1997; (citation omitted).2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997) provides the basic statutory outline for 
compensability of injuries to employees, as follows: 
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and 
*Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). 
2AE Clevite v. Labor Comm'q 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App., 2000), cert. den. 4 P. 3d 
1289 (Utah, 2000) 
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in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, 
if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: [benefits] * * * 
(emphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Labor Commission, following a similar 
determination by the Administrative Law Judge, under the specific facts of this case, must 
be found to have abused its discretion, that is to have overstepped "the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality," in its determination that Mr. Higgins was injured in the 
course and scope of his employment. 
The Employers assert that Mr. Higgins' injuries were not compensable because they 
did not "arise out of and in the course o f his employment but, rather, arose solely out of the 
personal activity of traveling to his regular place of employment and that the "going and 
coining rule" therefor bars his recovery. An evidentiary Hearing was held on June 17,2003 
before Administrative Law Judge Donald George who then issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order concluding that Mr. Higgins' injuries, under the specific facts 
of the case, were work-related and therefore compensable under the Act.3 A Motion for 
Review was timely filed and briefed by the parties and the Labor Commission issued its 
Order4 on November 6, 2003, similarly finding that Mr. Higgins was entitled to 
compensation because, under the particular facts of this case, the injuries suffered during his 
3Order of Judge George, R. 37 - 43 (Copy attached as Addendum hereto). 
4Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 66-70 (Copy attached to Employers' Brief). 
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travel from his home office to the kiosk of his Employer were within the statutory language 
of injuries "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment5." 
Employers timely filed their Writ of Review on December 1, 2003, and filed their 
Docketing Statement on December 19, 2003. Employers' Brief was filed on May 29,2004, 
following the granting of an Extension to that date. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As more fully reflected in the Argument below, in Point I, the determination of 
whether a particular activity is within the scope of employment is generally highly fact-
dependent, making it vitally important that all of the relevant facts be considered in 
determining a workers compensation case, as was done by Judge George and, subsequently, 
by the Commission. It is also vital that an Employer appealing such a decision accurately 
"marshal" all of the evidence from the Hearing in its Brief. It is respectfully submitted that 
Employers have failed to meet that obligation and, instead, have merely referenced some of 
the relevant facts and then asserted that Employee was simply injured en route to his 
workplace, where he was scheduled to work on the day of the collision. 
However, Judge George was very clear in his determinations regarding the particular 
facts of this case and the determination that this was more than merely a person driving to 
his place of employment. Judge George's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
included the following Findings of Fact at Pages 2 through 3: 
5Utah Code Anno. §34-2-401 (1997). 
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1. The Employer sells and services hydro massage products through kiosk locations 
in the Fashion Place, Cottonwood and Crossroads malls.6 
2. Employee had an "all the time job" which was to make the business run.7 
3. Employer has no office in a commercial location, only a small office in Mike 
Higgin's Home.8 
4. Employee's job duties included the performance of work at his home which would 
normally be performed at an employers' office, including: "scheduling people to work, 
calling from his home every morning to verify with those employees that they would be at 
work that day, covering shifts as necessary, gathering time cards, tracking inventory... and 
doing related work on the computer such as scheduling spreadsheets and generating reports 
for the owner."9 
5. Employee was provided a cell phone and a computer by the Employer to allow him 
to work at his home.10 
6. Product was shipped to Employee's home where he stored it in the garage. 
Employee delivered those products from his home to all various locations with his personal 
6Supra, note 3 at Findings of Fact No. 1 (R. 38). 
1
 Supra, note 3 at Findings of Fact No. 3 (R. 38). 
* Supra., note 6. 
9Supra, note 7. 
l0Id 
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vehicle. Part of Employee's duties included delivering supplies to each of the locations 
every day and collecting and depositing money11 
7. Employee was told to deduct his mileage on his tax return.12 
8. Employee's customary workday began at 8:00 a.m., when he would do work on 
the computer at home and call the employees scheduled to work that day. About 9:00 a.m., 
he would leave home to open business at one of the locations if he was covering a shift there 
or, if not, deliver product to each of the locations (as the kiosks had limited storage space), 
post schedules, pickup time cards and deposits, etc.13 
9. The night before the accident, Employee was excitedly showing his parents, with 
whom he was living, new product received that day, that he was going to set up for display 
at the mall the next day.14 
10. On the day of the accident, Employee opened the business computer at his home 
about 7:30 a.m. and made an entry. He was scheduled to work at the kiosk at the Fashion 
Place Mall at 10:00 that morning and was proceeding there when he was involved in the 
motor vehicle accident resulting in severe injuries.15 
In his Order, despite Mr. Higgins' inability to recall what he did that morning, Judge 
George further found that: 
uId 
nId. 
l3Supra, note 3 at Findings of Fact No. 4 (R. 38). 
uSupra, note 3 at Findings of Fact No. 5 (R. 38). 
15Supra, note 3 at Findings of Fact No. 6 (R. 39). 
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Furthermore, witnesses testified that petitioner had received new product that 
he needed to set up at the kiosks on the day of the accident. There is a 
preponderance of the evidence that petitioner was transporting new product 
from his home, where the company had it delivered, to the kiosk in the mall 
when the accident occurred."16 
The Labor Commission specifically adopted Judge George's Findings, which it 
summarized, in its Order Denying Motion for Review.17 Based upon the particular facts of 
this case, the Commission concluded: 
With respect to Mr. Higgins' claim, the Commission concludes that travel was 
an essential part of Mr. Higgins' employment. It was Mr. Higgins' duty to 
transport merchandise from his home to Aqua's sales locations, to travel 
between the sales locations, and to travel for other business purposes such as 
depositing sales receipts. Mr. Higgins' work-related travel was, therefore, the 
'condition' out of which his accident and injury arose. Furthermore, Mr. 
Higgins' automobile accident occurred while he was rendering a service to his 
employer, or at the very least was engaged in an activity that was necessarily 
incidental to his employment. In light of the foregoing, the Commission 
concludes that Mr. Higgins' injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment at Aqua.18 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Commission's Order does not "exceed the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality." 
The Commission's Findings and Conclusions in cases such as this are entitled to great 
deference and its conclusions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, whereby 
the Court will uphold the Commission's determination that an employee has been injured in 
the course of employment "unless the determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
'Supra, note 3 at Discussions and Analysis, Para. 5 (R. 40). 
1
 Supra., note 4. 
lSupra, note 4. 
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and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion under 63-46b-16 (h)(1) of the 
UAPA"19 and will resolve "any doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the 
injured employee."20 Particularly in a case which involves the highly fact-dependent issue 
of injury in the course of employment, as here, the courts are not inclined to try to impose 
a fact specific rule of law, because of the likelihood that no such rule would address all 
potential facts in such cases.21 
The particular facts of this case, taken as a whole, are more than sufficient as a basis 
upon which the Commission could reasonably have found, as it did, that Mr. Higgins' 
injuries were received while acting within the course and scope of his employment. He 
normally and regularly (including the morning of the accident) operated the office of the 
Employer at his home, from which he traveled to various locations on business for the 
Employer, including the travel to the kiosk at Fashion Place Mall during which he was 
injured. The travel on the day of the accident was not something which Mr. Higgins 
undertook on a whim or frolic of his own but, rather, as something which was part of his 
regular, expected duties on behalf of the Employer. As Judge George properly concluded 
under the facts of this case "The transit from home office to Fashion Place Mall was merely 
a movement from one workplace location to another."22 
Supra, note 2. 
20Id. 
21Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P. 2d 177, 182 (Utah, 1997J. 
22Supra, note 16. 
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POINT II. Since the Employee was traveling between two worksites, the "going and 
coming" rule has no application. 
The "going and coming rule" has no application to a factual situation in which the 
Employee has already commenced his work at the Employer's office and is in the process 
of traveling from that office to another location at which his services are required, for the 
benefit of his Employer. This exception also applies where an individual has a true "home 
office" and is traveling between the "home office" and another office or location of the 
Employer. Prior Utah case law, the case law of other jurisdictions involving similar cases, 
and the authoritative work of Professor Larson all provide clear support for the fact that the 
"going and coming" rule has no application to such cases and that persons injured during 
such transits and under similar factual situations, are entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits. 
Point III. The injuries arose out of and in the course of Employee's employment. 
As in the similar "home office" case of AE Clevite,23 whether the injury occurred at 
a worksite or location where the employer had control over the manner in which the 
employee chose to perform his work, and whether or not they requested, directed, 
encouraged or reasonably expected him to take such actions does not control the 
determination of whether the employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. An accident occurs in the course of employment when it "occurs while the 
employee is rendering services to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something 
23Supra, note 2. 
-9-
incident thereto, at the time and the place where he was authorized to render such service. "24 
The injury, as in AE Clevite, had a "causal relationship" with the employment and arose as 
a natural consequence of the "home office" arrangement. Under such circumstances, the 
injury arose during the course and scope of Mr. Higgins' employment and, as a result, he was 
entitled to the worker's compensation benefits awarded to him by the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS DO NOT 
EXCEED THE BOUNDS OF REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY 
The Utah Labor Commission has statutorily been given "the duty and the full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter."25 The 
Court will "grant the Commission a measure of discretion when applying legal standards to 
a given set of facts."26 The Court will not overturn the factual findings in a workers' 
compensation case, "unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, or 
contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence."27 In short, as this Court has 
previously explained, in a similarly involved, highly fact-dependent case: "Indeed, our prior 
24Supra, note 2, citing from Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n, 934 P. 2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 
App., 1997). 
25Supra, note 1. 
26McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 41 P. 3d 468, 473 (Utah, 2002). 
21
 Id, quoting from Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P. 2d 954, 956 (Utah App., 1988). 
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case law recognizes that 'whether or not the injury arises out of or within the scope of 
employment depends upon the particular facts of each case.'"28 
It is thus vitally important that all of the relevant facts be considered in determining 
a workers compensation case, as was done by Judge George and, subsequently, by the 
Commission. It is also, therefore, all the more vital that Employers carefully and properly 
"marshal" the evidence from the Hearing. That does not mean that Employers may select 
only portions of the material facts to set forth but, rather, that they must basically act as a 
"devil's advocate," presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists."29 
A party challenging the Commission's findings must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and demonstrate that those findings are unsupported by substantial 
evidence. Upon failure to do so, the court will "accept the Commission's findings as 
conclusive."30 
In Employers' Brief, rather than marshaling all the evidence in support of the Order, 
they reference only some of the relevant facts and assert that this was, therefore, merely a 
case in which Mr. Higgins was injured on a normal drive from home to his workplace, where 
he was scheduled to work on the day of the collision. However, when all of the particular 
28State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'q 685 P. 2d 1051, 1053 (Utah, 1984). 
29West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P. 2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App., 1991). 
30Merriam v. Industrial Comm'n, 812 P. 2d 447, 450 (Utah App., 1991); Featherstone v. 
Industrial Comm'q 877 P. 2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App., 1994). 
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facts of this case are taken into consideration, as they were by the Commission, the only 
logical conclusion was reached. There is nothing which would indicate that the decision 
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality under all of the facts of this case. 
Under the particular facts of this case, Mr. Higgins normally and regularly (including 
the morning of the accident) operated the office of the Employer at his home, from which 
he traveled to various locations on business for the Employer, including the travel to the 
kiosk at Fashion Place Mall during which he was injured. The travel on the day of the 
accident was not something which Mr. Higgins undertook on a whim or frolic of his own but, 
rather, as something which was part of his regular, expected duties on behalf of the 
Employer. As Judge George properly concluded under the facts of this case "The transit 
from home office to Fashion Place Mall was merely a movement from one workplace 
location to another."31 The "going and coming" rule simply has no application to a factual 
situation in which an employee is injured while traveling from one of the employers' 
worksites to another at which services are required, for the benefit of his employer. If that 
were the law, there would be no workers compensation coverage for the vast numbers of 
service and delivery employees in our state who regularly travel from an employer's office 
to various other work locations during the course of their employment. This is more fully 
addressed in POINT II of this Brief. 
Judge George and the Commission clearly had the prerogative to disregard the 
evidence in support of Mr. Higgins' claims and to find the underlying facts of this case to 
31
 Supra, note 16. 
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be different than they did. Had they found the facts to be otherwise, this case might have 
involved only a "coming and going" situation. However, they also had the prerogative to 
draw any applicable inferences and resolve any such evidence in favor of the Employee, and 
to arrive at the factual determinations they ultimately reached. Having arrived at those 
particular factual determinations, they properly applied Utah law to those facts and properly 
reached the correct conclusion that Mr. Higgins was acting within the course and scope of 
his employment at the time of the collision. It is not the Employers', nor this Court's, 
province to now impose its own judgment on such matters or to reweigh the evidence. 
POINT II 
SINCE EMPLOYEE WAS TRAVELING BETWEEN TWO WORKSITES, 
THE "GOING AND COMING" RULE HAS NO APPLICATION 
Utah's case law establishes that, in cases such as the present case where an employee 
is injured while traveling between a true "home office" and another worksite for the same 
company, he is entitled to compensation, even though the general rule provides that a person 
merely en route to or from a place of employment is not so entitled. 
In State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n,32 benefits were awarded to the widow 
of the president of a Company which maintained a regular business office and, across town 
from the business office in an apartment house, also maintained two apartments. One of the 
apartments (#8) was maintained as his home, where he lived with his wife. The other 
apartment (#14) was utilized as an office, where he maintained a desk, telephone and other 
office equipment. On the morning of his death, he went to apartment #14 about 7:00 a.m. 
3215 Utah 2d 363, 393 P. 2d 397 (Utah, 1964). 
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and remained there until his wife called him for breakfast. He returned to apartment #8 and 
had breakfast, then departed, and met his death while driving his usual route to his regular 
office. He also had a promotional device, designed to aid the business, in the trunk of his 
car. Under those circumstances, the Court affirmed the Commission's award of death 
benefits, explaining, "If he were actually going from one office to another, the mere fact that 
he made a stop to have breakfast would not necessarily take him out of the course of his 
employment."33 
Unfortunately, there only appear to have been two true "home office" cases 
considered by the Utah Courts. The most recent, A.E. Clevite v. Labor Commission,34 
involved an injury which occurred at the home office location rather than while traveling to 
another office of the employer. However, the facts established that the home had, as in Mr. 
Higgins5 case, actually become a separate office of the employer and regular worksite of the 
employee. Those facts are strikingly similar to the present case and are helpful in clarifying 
why the Commission properly determined that Mr. Higgins was in the process of traveling 
from one worksite to another at the time of his injuries, rather than merely being enroute to 
work. 
While not wholly in point, the analysis of the Utah Courts in a few other cases are 
helpful in understanding the Commission's decision. In Drake v. Industrial Commission,3 
33Id. at 398. 
34Supra, note 2. 
35Supra, note 21. 
-14-
the Commission denied worker's compensation benefits for injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident by an employee working as a referral coordinator for FHP in Salt Lake 
City. The facts as found by the Commission were that, because she lived in Ogden and there 
had been delays with normal couriers, her supervisor asked her to pick up and deliver 
referrals from and to the Ogden office two or three days a week on her way home. She 
received no additional income or mileage for those services, although they required that she 
take a five to six mile detour from her normal route home on the days she made such pickups 
or deliveries. She was involved in an automobile accident shortly after she had dropped off 
some referrals at the Ogden office and apparently before she had returned from the detour 
to her normal route home during which she would pick up her children at their child care 
center. The ALJ found that she was on a "special errand" and granted benefits but the 
Commission reversed. Upon Review, the Commission concluded that such deliveries had 
become part of her regular duties and, once she had dropped off the referrals at the Ogden 
office, she was merely traveling home from work and was no longer in the course of her 
employment. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Commission and reinstated the award. 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the denial by the 
Commission. The Supreme Court explained that the frequency of those errands made such 
trips a part of her normal duties, rather than "special errands". The Court agreed with the 
Commission, therefore, that her employment for the day ended after she had dropped off the 
materials at the Ogden location and she was not within the course and scope of her 
employment afterwards. This decision is helpful in the present case by reason of the 
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underlying dicta in the Court's determination that, if the injury had occurred during the 
course of travel between the Salt Lake City worksite and the Ogden site where she was to 
drop off the materials, she would have still been acting within the course and scope of her 
employment and would have been entitled to benefits. 
In Kinne v. Industrial Comm'n36, the Court upheld the Commission's award of 
benefits to a semi-truck driver who had taken a tractor home during an interruption in a trip 
and was subsequently killed in a collision while en route from his home to his employer's 
business to pick up a trailer and commence the final portion of his trip. The facts as found 
by the Commission indicated that it was the employee's regular practice to take the tractor 
to his home, where it was cleaned and serviced by him, which was done with the knowledge 
of the employer. Also, the maintenance tools were kept at the employee's home. Under such 
circumstances, the Court found that it was not unreasonable to find that "going and coming" 
rule did not apply and that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment 
while driving from his home (another worksite) to his employer's business location. 
In Moser v. Industrial Comm'n,37, the Court reversed the denial of benefits to a truck 
driver who was burned while trying to start his truck. The Commission had found that, on 
completion of a trip, the driver had checked in at the employer's terminal, learned of his 
assignment for the next day, and drove the truck home and parked it in a nearby lot, which 
was permitted by his employer, with the intent of driving it to the terminal the next day and 
36
 609 P. 2d 926 (Utah, 1980). 
37
 21 Utah 51, 440 P. 2d 23 (Utah, 1968). 
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proceeding with his trip. When he had difficulty starting the truck the next morning, he 
called the employer's manager who told him to check for ignition and gas and indicated that 
they would send assistance if he still could not get it started. In the course of carrying out 
those instructions, he poured gasoline in the carburetor and it spilled on him and ignited. 
The Court recognized that the activity was for the purpose of starting the truck in order to 
drive it to his place of employment, but explained that this fact apparently sidetracked the 
Commission, when that fact alone did not preclude recovery. The Court declared that the 
facts reflected a situation readily distinguishable from the usual case of going to or coming 
from work since, in order for the truck to continue its function in the defendant's business, 
someone had to deliver it to the terminal and the mere fact that this was also the plaintiffs 
transportation to work, did not exclude him from coverage. 
The cases cited by Employers in this case are not inapposite to the foregoing line of 
cases and involved factual situations significantly different from those involved in the present 
case before the Court. One was a case where an employer was sued for the negligent actions 
of its managerial employee in causing an accident while driving home after work38 and the 
Court explained that the "going and coming" rule would not be set aside based upon an 
employee's mere stated intent to make a few business calls when he got home. Another 
negligence case relied upon involved a "temp service" employee who had been offered a 
temporary job at a landfill and was injured while driving from her home to the landfill.39 The 
38Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life, 801 P. 2d 934 (Utah, 1989). 
39Windsor v. American States Insurance Co., 22 P. 3d 1246 (Utah App., 2001). 
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Court found that she had been on other temporary jobs for this service at other locations, but 
that was not sufficient to take her outside the "going and coming" rule The Court explained 
that this was the appropriate application of the law, at least where she was not traveling 
between the office of the "temp service" and the landfill. Another case relied upon by 
Employers involved a sales manager of a dairy, whose duties included working with and 
supervising personnel, and who was killed while driving to a special early morning meeting 
with the sales personnel,40 wherein the Court explained that he was not taken outside of the 
"going and coming" rule because he was only driving to the same worksite he was required 
to drive to anyway, albeit a little earlier than he otherwise would have driven to work. 
Another case involved an employee who was injured while driving a company truck to work, 
which was regularly used on the job but which he was allowed to take home for his own 
benefit41 so that he was not taken outside of the "going and coming rule". The final case 
Employers rely upon concerned an employee who was found to have been simply driving 
home from work and the Court found that merely having work implements from a prior job 
in the vehicle, was insufficient to take the case outside the "going and coming" rule.42 
In workers compensation cases, the Courts often look for assistance and support from 
the extensive, authoritative and often cited compendium of Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
lundberg v. Cream O' Weber. 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P. 2d 175 (Utah, 1970). 
Vanleeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P. 2d 281 (Utah App., 1995). 
-Cross v. Industrial Comm'n. 824 P. 2d 1202 (Utah, 1992) 
-18-
Compensation. Larson recognizes that, in factual situations such as in the present case, 
compensation is generally granted: 
"One category in which compensation is almost always awarded is that in 
which the employee travels along or across a public road between two portions 
of the employer's premises, whether going and coming, or pursuing active 
duties. * * * [T]he same principle reappears in the kind of case in which the 
employee performs a regular part of work at home, thus transforming the home 
into a sort of island identified as part of the employment premises, so that the 
trip between the home and the main plant may be analogized to a trip between 
two portions of the employer's premises." 43 
It is interesting that Professor Larson, as a footnote to the foregoing quote, notes: 
For an even stronger case in this category, because of the presence of an actual 
separate office in the employee's apartment building, see State Ins. Fund v. 
Industrial Comm'n", 15 Utah 2d 263, 393 P. 2d 397 (1964)."44 
This subject is again addressed, with a similar result, in connection with the "Dual-
Purpose Doctrine" and its application to telecommuters and others who perform some part 
of the work at home. After noting that a mere intent to perform some work at home is 
generally not sufficient (as our Supreme Court noted in Whitehead45), Larson explains: 
To bring clarity into this class of cases, it is helpful to begin with the 
assumption that in the particular problem the work duties associated with the 
employee's home are such that it can genuinely and not fictitiously be said that 
the home has become part of the employment premises. We are now ready to 
invoke the rule that travel between two parts of the employer's premises is in 
the course of employment."46 
Regularity of work at home is also an important factor in such determinations: 
'1 A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §13.01 [4] (2003). 
[Id. at footnote 91. 
'Supra, note 38. 
>%?ra,note43at§16.10[l]. 
-19-
"When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of 
employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific 
work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal 
indicia may be looked for: the quantity and regularity of work performed at 
home; the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and special 
circumstances of the particular employment that make it necessary and not 
merely personally convenient to work at home.47 
Professor Larson's conclusions are adequately supported by the case law of other 
jurisdictions as well. While recognizing the general applicability of the "going and coming" 
rule, courts of other jurisdictions have similarly determined that the general rule has no 
application where part of the duties of an employee consist of travel between a "home office" 
and another office of the employer during the day. Thus, employees were found to have 
been acting within the course and scope of their employment, despite the fact that they were 
traveling to or from a place of employment, under the following factual circumstances: a 
New York manager and president of a restaurant corporation, whose home contained the 
office used by the corporation for business mail and records, merchandise ordering, 
preparation of supplies, and employee scheduling, when he was killed driving a direct route 
from the restaurant to his home office;48 a New Mexico owner, officer and director of an 
electrical contracting company and a lounge, who had an office in his home used for the 
contracting business and lounge, and who was injured driving from the lounge to the home 
office;49 and a Montana employee who worked primarily out of his home office, but who was 
47%?ra,note43at§16.10[2]. 
48IntheMatterofWeimerv. Wei-Munch Limited, 498 N.Y.S. 2d 547,117 A.D. 2d 846 (NY, 
1986). 
49Garcia v. Phil Garcia's Electrical Contractor, Inc., 99N.M. 374,658 P. 2d 449 (N.M. App., 
1982). 
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expected to go to the company's main office at least once a week, and to conduct outside 
sales calls, who was injured in a fall on the way to his home office from the main office.50 
Such actual "home office" cases are still quite rare, since this is a relatively new 
approach to business. However, there do not appear to be any cases where the courts have 
made contrary determinations, when actual "home office" situations have been found to 
exist. Over the years, there have also been numerous cases in which the courts have found 
that, while there may not have been a true "home office", there was sufficient, regular work 
being done at the home to justify an award for injuries received at, or going to, the home.51 
Such cases do not involve new concepts. Rather, they are the natural offshoot of the 
exception for persons who were required to travel between different worksites as part of their 
duties, such as those in the following cases: benefits were awarded to a Mississippi television 
reporter who had agreed to edit a newspaper report to be aired that evening, but who was 
killed while driving to the station, where the facts showed that such reporters regularly wrote 
their stories at home, met the camera crew on location for filming, and only then would make 
the trip to the station to edit the video tape, which avoided wasted time for the benefit of both 
the station and the reporter;52 benefits were awarded for a Colorado home health aide, who 
worked for an elderly/disabled home care company and who was injured while traveling 
between her 2:00 appointment and her 3:00 appointment, although she was only paid for the 
50Bentz v. Liberty Northwest, 311 Mont. 361, 57 P. 3d 832 (Mont., 2002). 
51The Court's attention is directed to the capsulized, one page list of such cases and their facts 
as set forth in Larson, Supra, note 43 at §16.10[2]. 
52Wilson v. Service Broadcasters, Inc., 483 So. 2d 1339 (Miss., 1986). 
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time spent at the patient's homes;53 and benefits were awarded for a California farm worker 
who was regularly directed by the employer, during the day, to travel between various non-
contiguous ranches, which required the use of an automobile since there being no owner-
provided transportation, and who was injured on the way home at the end of the day in the 
vehicle he used for travel between the ranches.54 
In summary, Utah law, Larson's treatise, and the case law of other jurisdictions all 
provide substantial support for the decisions of Judge George and the Commission that the 
"going and coming" rule has no application to the particular facts involved in Mr. Higgin's 
case and that benefits should be awarded. 
POINT III 
THE INJURIES AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE 
OF MR. HIGGINS' EMPLOYMENT 
This Court has previously explained the circumstances under which an accident may 
be said to "arise out o f an individual's employment: 
[a]n accident arises out of employment when there is a causal relationship 
between the injury and the employment. Arising out of, however, does not 
mean that the accident must be caused by the employment; rather, the 
employment is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises 
than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.55 
53Bensonv. Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, 870 P. 2d 624 (Colo. App., 1994). 
54Hinoiosa v. Workers9 Compensation Appeals Board, 8 Cal. 3d 150, 501 P. 2d 1176, 104 
Cal. Rptr. 456 (Cal, 1972). 
55Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n, 934 P. 2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct App. 1997). 
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In short, there must be a showing of a "causal connection between the work and the injury."56 
As this Court has previously held, such a connection may be shown despite the fact that the 
Employee might have been equally exposed to such an injury apart from his employment. 
The fact situations regarding the home office in the present case and those in AE 
Clevite57 are comparable. Both employers used the employee's home as their office for 
business work, mail, deliveries, and other matters as they maintained on business office in 
the area. Both employees regularly performed services for the employer at the home 
location. Both employers provided computers, telephones, and other equipment regularly 
at the home office. The only significant difference was that the employee in AE Clevite was 
injured performing services at the home, rather than traveling between offices. 
The Employers' arguments in AE Clevite and in this case are also amazingly similar. 
Employers argue that Mr. Higgins was not at the worksite and they "had no control over 
petitioner's decision to commute to and from work, the route he chose, or the manner in 
which he drove his vehicle."58 They then argue, for the same reasons as justify the "going 
and coming" rule, Mr. Higgins cannot be entitled to compensation for injuries he received 
during such a "commute". The employer in AE Clevite made a similar argument regarding 
the employee's decision to salt his driveway, contending that they "never requested, directed, 
encouraged, or reasonably expected" the employee to salt his driveway. They also argued 
5682 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation §269 (1992). 
51
 Supra, note 2 
58Employers' Brief, p. 19. 
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that the employee was not injured by reason of any exposure to risk which he would not have 
encountered apart from his employment. The Court rejected those arguments in AE Clevite, 
however, finding that the Commission properly determined that his injury arose from a risk 
associated with his work because of the "work at home" arrangement. The Court explained 
that, even if the employee was not directed, encouraged or reasonably expected to take such 
actions, and was not in an "employer controlled" area when the injury occurred, that did not 
preclude recovery: 
Utah Courts, however, have recognized that an employee's injury arises in the 
course of employment even if these circumstances are not present. Indeed, 
'[ujnder Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course of employment when it 
'occurs while the employee is rendering services to his employer which he was 
hired to do or doing something incident thereto, at the time when and the 
place where he was authorized to render such service.'" Buczynski, 934 P. 2d 
at 1172 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see Black v. McDonald's of 
Layton, 733 P. 2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987) (indicating accident is in scope of 
employment when it occurs 'within the period of employment, at a place or 
area where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is 
engaged in an activity at least incidental to his employment"); 82 Am. Jur. 2d 
Workers' Compensation §266 (1992) (same). An activity is "incidental to the 
employee's employment if it advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's 
interests. " Black, 733 P. 2d at 156 (emphasis added).59 
The Court then concluded that there was a "causal relationship" with the employment since 
the employee's actions arose as a natural consequence of the "home office" arrangement. 
Under those particular factual circumstances, the Court declared that the employee's injuries 
arose "out o f and "in the course o f his employment. 
The risk to which Mr. Higgins was exposed and which caused his serious injuries, 
arose out of the "home office" arrangement and the requirements that he travel the highways 
*AE Clevite, Supra, note 2. 
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between that "home office" and the kiosk at the Fashion Place mall, at that particular time, 
for the purpose of delivering the materials to that kiosk and seeing to its operation. During 
such travel between the two worksites, Mr. Higgins was engaged in work for thejbmployer, 
as required by his employment, and was at one of his regular places of work during that 
travel when the injuries resulted. The Commission therefore properly determined that Mr. 
Higgins' injuries arose "out o f and "in the course o f his employment within the meaning 
of Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401, and that Mr. Higgins was entitled to the benefits sought. 
CONCLUSION 
The totality of the particular facts in this case fully support the determination that the 
injuries arose out of Mr. Higgins' employment and that they occurred within the course of 
employment of Mr. Higgins. We respectfully request, therefore, that this Court affirm the 
decision of the Commission awarding benefits to Mr. Higgins. 
RespectMly Submitted this & day of June, 2004 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
By: ••• ^ ^ t - ^ ^ " " 
Gary E.Atkfn 
K. Dawn Atkin 
Attorneys for Employee, Robert B. Higgins 
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June 11, 2001 @ 10:00 a., m. Room 336 
Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor 
160 E 300 S, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge. 
Robert Higgins (Higgins, petitioner) is represented by attorney K. 
Dawn Atkin. 
The respondents, Aqua Massage, LLC and 
Hartford/Twin City Fire Insurance (respondents) are represented by 
attorney Theodore Kanell. 
I. INTRODUCTION OF CASE 
Through his attorney, petitioner filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor 
Commission requesting medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total disability, 
permanent partial disability when MMI was reached, travel expenses and, interest. Petitioner 
claimed he suffered an industrial accident arising out of the course and scope of his employment 
on August 1, 2000 when he was in a motor vehicle accident driving product to Fashion Place 
Mall. The MVA resulted in a torn aorta, ruptured lung, fractured rib, spleen damage, head 
trauma and coma. The Application was assigned case number 2000807, a copy was sent to the 
respondents and an Answer thereto was timely filed and the matter was set for hearing. 
The hearing was held before the Hon. Donald George on June 11, 2001 at 10;00 am in the 
Heber M. Wells building. Testimony and evidence was submitted at the hearing and the matter 
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was taken under advisement. This tribunal now closes the record to further evidence and issues 
its final decision and order, as follows: 
II. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED 
1) Did the accident arise out of and in the scope and course of petitioner's employment. 
2) What is the proper wage rate for petitioner. 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Aqua Massage LLC (Aqua) is a small company started 5/05/2000 and owned by 
Petitioner's brother, Mike Higgins. The company sells and services hydro massage products 
through locations in the Fashion Place, Cottonwood and Crossroads malls. It has no office in a 
commercial location, only a small office in Mike Higgin's home. 
2. Petitioner left another job to work for Aqua and after one month was made assistant 
manager. At the time of the injury on 8/01/2000, Petitioner had a salary or $29,000 per year, 
with a possible bonus of $500 per month if quotas were met (which they were in May and June 
2000). Petitioner was not married and had no dependent children on the date of the injury. 
3. Per the owner's testimony, Petitioner has an "all the time job" which was to make the 
business run. Petitioner's job duties included scheduling people to work, calling from his home 
every morning to verify with those employees that they would be at work that day, covering 
shifts as necessary, gathering time cards, tracking inventory, delivering supplies to each of the 
locations every day, collecting and depositing money, and doing related work on the computer 
such as scheduling spreadsheets and generating reports for the owner. Petitioner was provided a 
computer by the company to allow him to work at his home. Product was shipped to Petitioner's 
home where he stored it in the garage. Petitioner delivered those products from his home to all 
various locations with his personal vehicle. Aqua provided Petitioner with a cell phone, and by 
the testimony of Respondents' witness, Camille Higgins, also told Petitioner to deduct his 
mileage on his tax return. 
4. Petitioner's customary workday began about 8:00 a.m. when he would do work on the 
computer at home and call the employees scheduled to work that day. About 9:00 a.m., 
Petitioner would leave home to open business at one of the locations if he was covering a shift 
there, or if not, deliver product to each of the locations (as the kiosks had limited storage space), 
post schedules, pick up time cards and deposits, etc. 
5. At the time of the accident petitioner lived with his parents. By the testimony of his 
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parents concerning the night before the accident, Petitioner was excitedly showing them new 
product received that day, that he was going to set up for display at the mall the next day. 
6. The following morning and according to his customary schedule, Petitioner opened the 
business computer at this home about 7:30 a.m. and made an entry. He was scheduled to work at 
Fashion Place Mall at 10:00 a.m. that morning and was proceeding there when he was involved 
in a motor vehicle accident resulting in severe injuries including a torn aorta, ruptured left lung, 
fractured rib, loss of his spleen, severe head trauma and resulting coma. 
7. As of the date of the hearing, petitioner had not reached MMI. 
IV. PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-25 requires compensation to be paid for injuries arising out of 
and in the scope and course of employment. Under this statute, the employee must prove two 
essential elements: (1) the accident occurred "in the course of the employment, and (2) the 
accident "arose out of the employment. 
[Under Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course of employment when it 'occurs while 
the employee is rendering services to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something 
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such service. 
Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169 at 1172 . 
An injury can be found to "arise out of employment when injury was one of the risks 
connected with the employment. 
An accident arises out of employment when there is a causal relationship between 
the injury and the employment. Arising out of, however, does not mean that the 
accident must be caused by the employment; rather, the employment is thought of 
more as a condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing the 
event in affirmative fashion. 
Buczvnski at 1172. (emphasis in original.) See also AE Clevite v. Labor Comm'n 996 P.2d 
1072 
The injury has been held compensable where transportation was furnished by the 
employer to the benefit of the employer, id.; where the employer requires the 
employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business. 
Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 398 P.2d 545. 
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V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The primary issue in this case was the question of whether the accident arose out of and 
in the scope and course of petitioner's employment. 
At the hearing, respondents argued that the motor vehicle accident did not arise "in the 
course and scope of employment" because the employer had allowed petitioner to work from 
home for petitioner's convenience rather than benefitting the company, and that on the day of 
accident, Petitioner did not show he did anything specific to benefit the company at his home 
office. 
As to the first theory, since Petitioner cannot recall what he did that morning, we rely on 
what were his undisputed customary practices in the morning, supported by testimony of 
petitioner and the owner of the company, Mike Higgins, which indicated that he would do work 
on the computer and call the employees for the day to verify that they would be coming into the 
various locations. It was undisputed that the petitioner's computer had an entry on it for the 
morning of August 1, 2000 which is consistent with the customary routine described by the 
witnesses. Furthermore, witnesses testified that petitioner had received new product that he 
needed to set up at the kiosks on the day of the accident. There is a preponderance of evidence 
supporting the conclusion that Petitioner regularly did work for the benefit of Aqua at his home, 
and specifically, that he did so on the morning of 8/01/2000 before his accident. 
Respondents then argue that under the "coming and going" rule, petitioner cannot recover 
because travel from a person's home to work is generally not within the course and scope of his 
employment. 
With the conclusion that Petitioner was already at work when he was doing things for the 
benefit of the company at his home that morning, the "coming and going" rule is inapplicable. 
The transit from home office to Fashion Place Mall was merely a movement from one workplace 
location to another. This travel from one workplace location to another was part of petitioner's 
job duties and the accident arose out of performance of this duty. In addition, there is a 
preponderance of the evidence that petitioner was transporting new product from his home, 
where the company had it delivered, to the kiosk in the mall when the accident occurred. 
Petitioner was performing his job duties at the time of the accident. 
Petitioner's income at the time of the injury included commissions of $500.00 per month 
when certain criteria were met. Petitioner met that criteria in May and June of 2000, but not in 
July of 2000. Calculation of the average weekly wage, therefore, is based on §34A-2-409(l)(g) 
the thirteen week average preceding the injury (May 3, 2000 - August 1, 2000). For 8.58 weeks 
petitioner received $673.16 per week and for 4.42 weeks petitioner received $557.69 per week. 
The average weekly wage, therefore is $633.45. $633.45 X 2/3 = $423.00. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This tribunal reviewed the testimony of the witnesses, medical evidence and all evidence 
on file. Finding the preponderance of the evidence is that the petitioner was working from home 
on the morning of the accident. The work performed was for the benefit of the employer. Travel 
from the home workplace to the kiosk at the mall, was simply moving from one workplace to 
another, and was required in order to deliver product which was one of petitioner's job duties. As 
such, the coming and going exception to workers compensation coverage does not apply in this 
case. 
• The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial accident on August 1, 2000 resulting 
in severe injuries including a torn aorta, ruptured left lung, fractured rib, loss of his 
spleen, severe head trauma and resulting coma 
•As of the date of the hearing, MMI had not occurred. 
• Respondents are liable for Temporary Total Disability from August 1, 2000 through 
June 11, 2001 and ongoing until MMI is reached at the rate of $423.00 per week plus 
interest at the statutory rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. 
•Respondents are liable for Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) compensation when MMI 
is reached. 
•Respondents are liable for Medical expenses related to petitioner's industrial accident of 
August 1, 2000 according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Labor Commission of Utah, and travel allowances under Utah 
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, consistent with this opinion, Aqua Massage, LLC 
and/or Hartford/Twin City Fire Insurance pay Robert Higgins for the following benefits related to 
his August 1, 2000 industrial accident: 
•Temporary Total Disability from August 1, 2000 to June 11, 2001 in the amount of 
$19,035.00 (45 weeks X $423.00 per week) plus interest at the statutory rate of eight 
percent (8%) per annum. 
•Ongoing Temporary Total Disability thereafter in accordance with §34A-2-410 and 
supporting medical documentation plus interest at the statutory rate of eight percent (8%) 
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per annum. 
• Medical expenses related to petitioner's industrial accident of August 1, 2000 
according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the 
Labor Commission of Utah, and travel allowances under Utah Administrative Code, Rule 
612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys fees, in the amount of $3,807.00, 
plus 20% of the interest paid to petitioner, plus attorney's fees in accordance with Rule R602-2-
4(D)of the additional TTD and interest owing be paid directly to K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. That 
amount shall be deducted from petitioner's award and shall be sent directly to Ms. Atkin's office. 
/ r ^ d a v o f ^ DATED this I Y ^ M a v of {fV-^J> , 2003. 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set for the specific basis 
for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is 
signed. Other partied may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any Party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /7 day oi^JjAyyui- ,*1PD3>, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, for case no. 2000807 
Robert Higgins v. Aqua Massage, LLC and/or Hartford/Twin City Fire Insurance to the 
following parties: 
Brad Higgins 
2334 River Road #24 
St. George, Utah 84790 
K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ted Kanell, Esq. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 South Temple STE 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1131 
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